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There are two basic stories when it comes to the
human pursuit of knowledge, one cautionary and one
intrepid. Since Kant defined the Enlightenment with
the dictum “Dare to know,” the latter kind of story has
been in ascendance. Take the tale of Faust as an
iconic example. Traditionally a tragedy about the dire
consequences of hubris, Faust became through
Goethe’s pen a saga of noble striving, in which the
unfettered pursuit of knowledge brings great reward.
The presumption in contemporary liberal democracies
is that knowledge is a fundamental good and the
freedom to pursue it is a basic human right.
But now consider a non-fiction story. In 1951, a
doctoral student in microbiology named Johan Hultin
dug through six feet of tundra and permafrost in
Alaska. He then dug into the well-preserved bodies of
four victims of the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic.
Hoping to recover live flu virus, he transported tissue
samples to his lab in Iowa and exposed ferrets to
them. The animals did not get sick and Hultin
abandoned the project. But in 1995, scientists at the
U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology set about
the task of resurrecting the flu virus from their
collection of dried and fixed tissue from victims of
the pandemic. Jeffry Taubenberger, the head of the
division of molecular pathology, remarked “I really
wanted to see if there was some way we could make
use of this vast, wonderful collection” [1]. With
Hultin’s assistance and advanced genetic sequencing
techniques, the attempt succeeded this time. In 2005,
the complete genetic sequence of the 1918 influenza
A (H1N1) virus was published in Science.
Note: They had just resurrected and published the
blueprint for the greatest killer in human history. And
that is not all. Scientists have published an article
describing how to render the mousepox virus more
virulent and immune to vaccination. They have synthe-
sized the polio virus from scratch in order to warn
society that terrorists could do the same. And they have
built and tested bacteria-laden weapons for “threat
assessment” purposes. This kind of research makes that
thing Pandora opened look like a box of toys. One
begins to wonder if this is what Kant had in mind.
The decision to publish the Spanish Flu genome
was approved by a U.S. governmental advisory board,
which concluded that the scientific benefit of the
research far outweighed its potential risk of misuse.
This knowledge could help scientists identify and
combat the next pandemic. Of course, it could also be
used to cause the next pandemic. Welcome to the
dual-use dilemma, which Seumas Miller and Michael
Selgelid argue arises from the fact that “one and the
same piece of scientific research sometimes has
the potential to be used for harm as well as for good”
(p. 1). In this report, originally produced for the
Australian government and previously published in







provide a concise, clear-headed, and helpful introduc-
tion to the policy and ethical implications of the dual-
use dilemma in the biological sciences. It should be
read by policymakers and scientists. Many others,
including students and scholars studying the inter-
actions of science, technology, and society, would
benefit from this pithy report.
What the authors make clear is that the dilemma is
fundamentally about trade-offs. Though knowledge
and freedom of inquiry are fundamental moral values,
they are not absolute values. They exist within a
broader ecology of goods, including security and
human health. Sometimes these synergize or serve
one another, but at other times they clash, setting the
stage for a tragedy: “research undertaken to promote
human health might instead by used to destroy human
health” (p. 3). When values collide, decisions must be
made. With their keen analytic abilities, Miller and
Selgelid have created an excellent guide for such
decisions, both in terms of moral reasoning and public
policy options.
Though they freely admit that the devil is often in
the details, meticulous ethical analysis is simply
beyond the scope of their report. Instead, they
conceptually frame and parse the relevant moral
questions, establishing a framework to guide analyses
in particular cases. Their primary emphasis is on the
need to maintain a “commonsense position” that
strikes a “reasonable balance” between competing
values (p. 44). They helpfully show how this can be
cast in both utilitarian (e.g., balancing potential
benefits against potential costs) and deontological
(e.g., balancing rights to free inquiry against rights to
security or health) terms. Virtue ethics is also laced
throughout the report. After all, there is no dual-use
dilemma without the vicious character of certain
nefarious individuals eager to twist the good inten-
tions of others into malevolence. And a great deal
rides on the moral and intellectual virtues of scientists
who are pursuing potentially dangerous knowledge
and must discern their responsibilities.
Throughout, Miller and Selgelid rightly emphasize
the uncertainty that characterizes any kind of moral
reasoning in the dual-use dilemma. Uncertainty is
magnified, because the actors involved are responsive
to the problem and to the actions of others. Managing
uncertainty requires building in capacities for creative
solutions. Indeed, the authors emphasize creativity or
“designing-in ethics,” not only for this reason, but
also because it can negate the need to make a trade-
off, allowing “us to have our cake and eat it” (p. 4).
Miller and Selgelid succeed in crafting a guide to
thinking that is concise and focused on the essentials.
They are able to do so by adopting the U.S. National
Research Council’s tactic of mapping the dual-use
dilemma atop a set of salient “experiments of
concern.” This gives them concrete material for
structuring their moral considerations and public
policy recommendations. There are other ways to
structure an analysis of the dual-use dilemma. For
example, one could attempt a taxonomy of types of
artifacts (e.g., bench-top DNA synthesizer) that cut
across different experiments. This would have the
added benefit of casting the dual-use dilemma in a
wider lens. After all, nearly all knowledge and
artifacts, despite good intentions, can produce fore-
seeable bad effects. Pens can become stabbing instru-
ments, and commercial airplanes can become
missiles. Miller and Selgelid are clearly aware of this
and would most likely concede the importance of
reflecting on dual-use more broadly.
But their purpose is more narrowly defined, and their
choice of framework allows them, in the final chapter, to
identify and analyze a set of policy options regarding the
imposition of limits on dual-use research and the
dissemination of potentially dangerous knowledge. This
is the most original and useful portion of the report. The
resulting matrix stretches horizontally across a contin-
uum of five options ranging from the least to the most
intrusive or restrictive. For example, option one grants
full autonomy to the scientific community, whereas
option five gives the government “ultimate and overrid-
ing decision-making authority in relation to dual-use
research and dual-use publication” (p. 61). The vertical
axis of the matrix is populated by six categories of
decision. These include questions of who should make
the decisions about research and dissemination or
censorship of findings, whether there should be manda-
tory regulations, whether there should be licensing of
dual-use technologies/techniques, and whether there
should be mandatory education, training, and personnel
security restrictions.
Miller and Selgelid make the case that an indepen-
dent panel (independent of research institutions and
government) may be the best option for the location of
decision-making authority. Of course, ensuring inde-
pendence will be difficult as the panel would require
funding. This independent body “would be comprised
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of scientists, security experts…and ethicists” (p. 59).
Noticeably absent is any “lay” member of society. The
argument, presumably, is that some mechanic, baker,
housewife, or lawyer would not have any relevant
expertise to offer. Perhaps not, but, then again, this
might be precisely why they are needed. Experts have a
way of thinking narrowly—that is why we call them
specialists. They also have a tendency to become jaded
through training and blinded by methodology. The
hope, frankly, is that where experts would bury their
noses in cost-benefit equations, a non-expert would be
attuned to the absurdity of resurrecting viruses or
engineering more virulent pathogens. Absent this
corrective, a panel of myopic experts seems more likely
to approve research justified by such dubious constructs
as “threat assessment.” It is just this kind of cold,
abstract jargon that simultaneously animates expert
discourse and deadens our powers of moral imagination.
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